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Introduction
‘Habt ihr Sehnsucht nach Europen? Vor euch liegt es in den Tropen; denn 
Europa ist Begriff. [Do you long for Europe? It is all around you in the 
tropics; for Europe is of the mind.] (Klemperer, 1987, p. 169).' These are 
the words with which Victor Klemperer attempted to comfort those of his 
friends who, having emigrated, found themselves filled with nostalgia for 
the Europe they had left behind them. By ‘Europe is of the mind’ he meant 
to say Europe is more than just the name of a particular geographical area, 
it is an idea. An idea we could also call the Occident or the West. For the 
distinction is no longer made between the originally more religious concept 
of the Occident and the more secular one of Europe. Europe and the 
Occident, European and occidental are almost always used as synonyms of 
one another, although it should be noted that unlike Occident, Europe is also 
the name of a set of political ideas with a long tradition.
The idea of community has underpinned these ideas since the 
seventeenth century finding expression, for instance, in the phrase 
‘europäisches Gleichgewicht' [‘European balance of power’]. The notion 
of a balance is entirely compatible with the idea of a leading power and in 
German eyes, Germany has played precisely this role of leader since the 
late seventeenth century - a role legitimised by the incontrovertible 
argument that Germany is at the geographical heart of Europe. In 1670 
Leibniz reasoned that ‘the Roman Empire is a country sufficient unto itself, 
which has only to desire its happiness for it to come about. Europe is the 
body, Germany the heart of Europe’.2 In this sense, Germany determined 
the condition of Europe as a whole. If it were to regain its status as a ‘civil
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entity, clearly delineated’, then ‘Europe as a whole would return to peaceful 
ways, its internal discourse would cease’ (Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 473).3 
In this way, ‘Germany would blossom again and equilibrium return to 
Europe’ (Brunner, vol. II, 1975, p. 969).4
Novalis took up Leibniz’s ideas again in the sense that they involve 
the cultural dominance of Germany:
Deutschland geht einen langsamen aber sicheren Gang vor den übrigen 
europäischen Ländern voraus [...] der Deutsche [bildet sich] mit allem Fleiß 
zum Genossen einer höheren Epoche der Cultur, und dieser Vorschritt muß 
ihm ein großes Uebergewicht über die Andere[n] im Lauf der Zeit geben. 
(Novalis, 1983, p. 519)
[Slowly but surely Germany proceeds ahead of the other European countries. The 
sheer application of the German enables him to achieve a higher level of civilisation 
and through this greater elevation generally to gain dominance over the others.]
In 1801 an unknown author opined that ‘peace and security in 
Germany served at the same time to ensure these conditions in a large part 
of Europe’ (Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 481).5
The idea of a German leadership sees its apotheosis after the wars of 
liberation when the argument appeared concerning God’s chosen people:
[...] dieses Volk [ist] von Gott dazu ausersehen [...], der Führer und 
Vorkämpfer Europas auf der Bahn echt christlicher Bildung zu werden und 
die Geschichte des ganzen Erdteils in sich selbst vorzubilden. (Brunner, vol. 
I, 1972, p. 793)
[[.. .]this people is predestined by God to be the leaders, to be the vanguard of Europe 
in its progress towards a truly Christian education and to prefigure in itself the history 
of the whole hemisphere.]
The legacy of these radical nationalistic ideas was embraced as we 
now know by the ideology of National Socialism. One phrase will serve to 
illustrate this in the 1942 edition of what has become known as the ‘brown’ 
Meyer, Meyer being a popular German encyclopaedia and the epithet 
‘brown’ referring to the National Socialist bias in the work. The entry under 
‘Reich’ informs the reader of the ‘schicksalhafte Sendungsaufgabe der 
Deutschen in Europa’ [‘divine destiny of the Germans in Europe’].
As well as informing the concept of a European balance under German 
leadership, the idea of community appears from the early years of the 
eighteenth century onwards in various federalist constructs. A few fixed 
expressions will serve to illustrate the phases in this process. In 1732,
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Johann Jacob Moser laid ‘the foundation for the study of the current 
constitution in Europe’ (Brunner, vol. VII, 1992, pp. 119, 120).6 In 1800 
Gentz spoke of the ‘natural federal constitution of Europe’ (Brunner, vol. I, 
1972, p. 639).7 In 1814 K. C. Krause presented the draft for a European 
Federation of States. In his 1821 piece entitled Der Europäische Bund [The 
European Federation] Conrad Friedrich von Schmidt-Phiseldeck used 
alongside of one another expressions such as the Federal Association o f  
European Peoples, European Federation, European Federal State, 
European Confederation, European Bund, European Union (Schumacher, 
1976, p. 187).8 In 1832 Wirth exhorted those taking part in the Hambacher 
festival with the words: ‘Dreimal hoch das konföderierte republikanische 
Europa!’.[‘Three cheers for the Republican European Confederation’] 
(Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 628). Friedrich Nietzsche prophesied that: ‘Die 
wirtschaftliche Einigung Europas kommt mit Notwendigkeit’, [‘the 
economic unification of Europe is bound to come about’] (Schlechta, vol. 
3, 1960, p. 660) and in his Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond Good and 
Evil] of 1885 he discerned ‘signs of Europe’s desire to become one’ (ibid, 
vol. 2, p. 724).9 Finally in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi developed the idea of 
the ‘Vereinigten Staaten von Europa’ [‘United States of Europe’].
No changes in the developments we are describing seem to have been 
brought about by the hiatus between 1933 and 1945. ‘European unity’ 
continued to be the common aim behind many political projects, however 
differently the concept may have been elaborated. Party political allegiance 
appeared to be irrelevant in this respect. Europe developed:
zu einem zentralen politischen Programm und schließlich zu einer Realität, 
die zunehmend die internationale Politik und den Alltag des einzelnen 
bestimmt. (Jung/Wengeler, 1995, p. 93)
[a central political platform and in due course a reality which increasingly determines 
both international politics and the everyday life of the individual]
Integration o f Europe, a phrase already in use in 1943 for instance by 
Alfred Weber, before Schumacher used it in 1948, became a key political 
principle. It was variously represented in expressions which had been 
established usage since the eighteenth century, such as federation'0, bund", 
unity’2, unification'3, United States o f Europe14 and finally ‘community”5 
which Jung and Wengeler (ibid, p. 105) described as a ‘willkommene 
Kompromißbegriff [‘useful compromise expression’] and the aim of the 
community was to promote economic activity, the ‘economic unity of 
Europe’ (Adenauer speech 21/09/1949).16 Here we get a sense of the
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German self-confidence that resulted, at least in part, from the permanent 
stereotype of Germany as lying at the heart of Europe, in the middle of 
Europe, as being the heart of Europe. From the German point of view, the 
logic of the economic reintegration of Europe necessarily involved the 
proposition ‘without Germany, no Europe’. This idea had been expounded 
by Alfred Weber already in 1943, less forcefully perhaps, but nevertheless 
quite clearly:
[für] die produktionswirtschaftliche Integration Europas, das Abhängen der 
Prosperität des einen Teils vom anderen [...] [ist] das in der Mitte liegende 
Deutschland, seine große Bevölkerung und Produktivkraft ein un-
entbehrlicher Teil. [,..]Ohne deutsche Lieferkraft und Kaufkraft keine 
gesunde volle Lieferfähigkeit und Kaufkraft der anderen Teile von Europa, 
der rings umliegenden, aus ökonomischen und klimatischen Notwendigkeiten 
wirtschaftlich mit ihm integrierten Gebiete und Bevölkemngen. (Weber, 
1946, p. 246)
[[for] the economic integration of Europe and the interdependence of the prosperity of 
its parts, the central position of Germany in Europe, its huge population and the level 
of its productive output, are indispensable. Without Germany and without German 
output and without its buying power, there can be no strong supply or buying power in 
the other parts of Europe, of those peoples and regions which surround Germany and 
which are closely integrated with her economically by virtue of climatic conditions 
and modes of production.]
Kurt Schumacher used the economic potential of the industrial Ruhr 
area of Germany to put forward the argument for Europe as follows:
Das Ruhrgebiet ist [...] das stärkste industrielle Kraftzentrum Europas. Und 
mit und durch das Ruhrgebiet hat ja auch in früheren besseren Zeiten Europa 
allein leben können. Wir Sozialdemokraten erkennen ausdrücklich an, daß die 
wirtschaftlichen Kräfte des Ruhrgebietes zur Wiedergutmachung der 
Zerstörung Europas herangezogen werden müssen [...]. So wie Europa das 
Ruhrgebiet braucht, so braucht Deutschland als ein Teil Europas die 
Mitbeteiligung an diesem Ruhrgebiet. (Schumacher, 9.5.1946)
[The Ruhr is the strongest industrial centre in Europe and it was by and through the 
Ruhr that Europe could remain autonomous in the past. As Social Democrats we state 
unequivocally that the economic strength of the Ruhr must be harnessed in the task in 
making good the destruction wrought in Europe. Just as Europe needs the Ruhr, so 
Germany as a part of Europe, needs to be closely involved in the development of this 
area.]
In the pan-European perspective, we may instance the 1948 essay by 
the economist Ernst Brödner, entitled ‘Europe and the German Future’ the
argument was made that Germany was best kept in check by integration. 
Brödner writes:
Sicherheit gibt es nur, wenn Deutschlands Industrie ein Teil der europäischen 
ist. Nur die engste wirtschaftliche Verflechtung durch Arbeitsteilung ist eine 
wirksame Kontrolle gegen heimliche Wiederaufrüstung und eine Sicherheit, 
daß europäische Bniderkriege in Zukunft ausgeschlossen sind. (Brödner, S. 
429).
[There will only be security if German industry is part of European industry. Only 
close economic co-operation in the form of shared production will be an efficient 
brake on secret rearmament and will ensure that in future there will be no more civil 
wars in Europe.]
So far we have shown that the political, pragmatic, idea of Europe was 
taken up again after 1945 in the context of the desired restructuring of 
Europe.
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Expressions in European Discourse and their Political Contexts
Most of the concepts of Europe of the early post-war years are deeply 
rooted in the history of European thought. Thus in texts from this period 
there is a plethora of references to a European cultural community and a 
community of values. Political ideas are elaborated which urgently invoke 
Germany’s western tradition, often in a more or less formulaic form. We 
encounter ‘the spiritual and moral values and principles of European 
culture’ (Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 9):17 ‘the central 
Christian western values’ (Programmentwurf der CDU, 17/06/1945);18 
‘European consciousness [...] western culture [...] preservation of western 
culture’ (Mayer, 1947, p. 232);19 ‘the spirit of the West’ (Weber, 1946, p. 
221);20 ‘for the sake of the spiritual values and the culture of the West’ 
(Adenauer speech, 24/03/1946);21 ‘the mind of western man’ (Kiinneth, 
1947, p. 66);22 ‘the western culture of Christianity’ (ibid, p. 254);23 ‘all 
western values and societal structures which came down to us from the 
Greeks, the Romans and the Jews, were refashioned by the Germanic 
tribes’ (Niekisch, 1953, p. 266).24
Germany and the Germans were given clear prominence as a part of 
this western history as inheritors of the occidental values and the 
appearance, for instance, of the possessive pronoun in extracts such as the 
following:
[das] Grundgesetz unseres Werdens .. heißt: Abendland, Einheit der 
Romanen, Germanen und Slawen, vor allem aber der Romanen und 
Germanen im Zeichen von Antike und Christentum. (Dirks, 1990, pp. 192) 
[The underlying factors shaping our development are the Occident and the unity of the 
Germanic, Gallic and Slav tribes. Above all of the Gallic and Germanic peoples in the 
context of the classical period on the one hand, and Christianity on the other.]
Ursprung unserer abendländischen Kultur [sind] die jonischen Griechen, die 
Männer der Stoa, Cicero. (Röpke, 1947, p. 12)
[The origins of our western culture lie with the Ionian Greeks, the Stoics, Cicero.]
Quellen unserer europäischen Kultur, die aus dem Christentum entspringen. 
(Adenauer speech, 21/9/1949).
[The wellsprings of our European culture which are fed by Christianity.]
These concepts were clearly influenced by the political conditions of 
the early post-war period. Post-war Germany was rooted in the experience 
of liberation from without, National Socialism defeated by the Allies, a war 
lost by Germany, the lack of a sovereign state, German guilt. No other 
society had to examine its immediate past, present and future as intensely 
as German society after 1945. No other society had the opportunity of 
choosing a new way forward so clearly based on a critique of the 
immediate past:
Während alle übrigen europäischen Völker [...] ein festes, bestimmtes 
Verhältnis zu der Wirklichkeit haben, in die sie gestellt sind [...], sind die 
Deutschen ein Volk der Möglichkeiten, nicht der Tatsachen. (Kogon, 1946,. 
p.414)
[Whilst all the other European peoples have a clear unambiguous relationship to the 
reality surrounding them, Germany is a nation of possibilities, not facts.]
One of the possible reasons adduced by Kogon in 1946 for Germany’s 
lack of direction after the war, was the palpable rejection of National 
Socialism. This had been ordained by the victors, occupiers and liberators. 
For the moment, Germany was excluded from Europe, indeed, from the 
world. The Germans stood accused in the eyes of the world, challenged by 
the Allies to prove the sincerity of what they were saying. These conditions 
determined post-war reality in Germany, including the German language 
and therefore also the way in which such key terms as Europe and the West 
were used:
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‘Das Abendland’. Das Wort ist, formal gesehen, eine gute Parole: es ist mit 
Wert und Sinn gesättigt, zugleich aber anschaulich und konkret, man kann es 
seelisch, man kann es geistig, man kann es politisch nehmen. [...] Der Begriff 
entspricht offenbar einem geistigen Bedürfnis, er scheint als Antwort auf eine 
oft gestellte Frage empfunden zu werden. [...] Wie sind wir dahin gekommen, 
wo wir jetzt stehen? [...] Und wenn wir das zu wissen glauben: wie kommen 
wir wieder heraus, zurück zu einer echten Ordnung, zu Sinn und Wert? 
(Dirks, 1990, pp. 192)
[The West’. From a formal point of view, the word is a useful slogan, profoundly 
meaningful yet solid: it can be taken spiritually or intellectually or politically [...] The 
concept clearly meets an intellectual need. It seems to be regarded as the answer to a 
frequent question: How did we get to where we are now? [...] and if we think that we 
can answer that: How do we find our way out and back to order, to a set of meaningful 
values?]
This was Walter Dirks’ observation on the European discourse of the 
early post-war period.
The challenge then to ‘show you mean what you say’ is the subject of 
the following discussion. The post-war years were characterised in this 
sense by the instrumentalisation of ideas of Europe in support of certain 
lines of argumentation.
Argumentational Structures in European Discourse and their 
Temporal References
The task then was to adduce plausible arguments and to demonstrate the 
credibility of stated aims. It is in this context that Europe began to be used 
differently in the early years in the sense that it was made to function as an 
argument in favour of reintegration. Europe and the West represented a 
kind of collective super argument at the time. Both terms are components 
of what Klein has called ‘kollektive Argumentationen’ [‘collective 
arguments’] (Klein, 1985, p. 217). Toulmin described the main function of 
argumentational structures as being to justify assertions (Toulmin, 1975, 
p. 18). The assertion, or in other words, the claim, of the Germans after 
1945 could be summed up as follows: ‘The Germans stand in the main 
tradition of western Humanism’. The claim is a reaction, a response, to the 
difficulty raised by the rest of the world, the Allies, victors and liberators. 
The problem briefly is ‘All the Germans are Nazis, have become culpable, 
have foregone any claims to integration in the community of nations’.
The quality of arguments may be judged by their acceptability, which 
is in turn predicated on what is considered to be true, incontrovertible, at 
the very least, plausible. So, arguments may be more or less acceptable 
according to how far they fulfil these three conditions.
The most common collective arguments in the political discourse of 
the early post-war years were therefore, like any arguments, attempts to 
establish the plausibility of given aims. What the Germans had to do was to 
use a given positive component of the collective consciousness, here 
Germany’s place in the European cultural community, to transform the 
collectively problematical, the accusation of moral deprivation, into another 
collectively acceptable state of affairs, Germany’s reintegration into the 
family of nations. See Klein (1985, p. 213) for the terminology used here 
such as the concept of ‘collective’.
Two temporal frames of reference both encountered frequently in early 
post war texts bear upon the basic claim asserted in the idea of integration - 
they are the past and the future. On the one hand the past is explained and 
assessed, National Socialism and its causes are repeatedly explicated and 
evaluated. On the other, a version of the future is projected, social and 
political reconstruction are called into being through a language which 
declares that which is desirable to be in existence already. Concepts of 
Europe are introduced into the argumentational structures in a variety of 
ways. We need to establish the agents in this process and the identity of the 
participants in the European debate in early post-war Germany. These 
include not only politicians but also cultural commentators, intellectuals, 
philosophers, theologians, an intellectual elite, therefore a heterogeneous 
group holding very different views as to how the recent past might be 
explained and with different ideas about the future shape of German 
society. The reflections of this intellectual elite on past and future, centred 
on a number of key ideas including Europe, or the West. These two 
concepts are tokens of the very many expressions for an idea which had 
informed political discourse since the beginning of the modem period, 
appearing as an ideal, a structural principle and a guide to possible action. 
Two factors were common to all of the variants of this basic idea, 
community and unity. The following discussion aims to describe the 
process whereby concepts of Europe were instrumentalised in a variety of 
ways according both to the different philosophical outlooks of those taking 
part in the discourse and to the relationship of the argument in question to 
the past or the future. Arguments dealing with the causes of historical
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phenomena draw on the past, those attempting the task of laying these 
phenomena to rest are future orientated.
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Arguments Concerning Causes
When the aim was to identify the causes of a line of development which 
culminated in National Socialism, historical processes from European or 
western history were adduced:
Wir stehen mit der Katastrophe, die wir durchlebt haben und noch 
durchleben, für jeden, der etwas Blick hat, deutlich am Ende der bisherigen 
Art der Geschichte, der Geschichte nämlich, die wesentlich vom Abendland 
her bestimmt war. (Weber, 1946, p. 10)
[To those with any insight, it must be clear that the cataclysmic period we have 
experienced and are still going through heralds the end of history as we have known it 
up until now. A history in other words which was fundamentally shaped by the West.]
Alfred Weber wrote this during the war in 1943, his End of History - 
Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte - appeared in 1946. Weber claimed 
to have identified a caesura brought about primarily by scientific 
discoveries and technological innovations which interrupted the progress of 
western history and took control of ‘unsere abendländischen Masen’ [‘the 
western masses’] (ibid, p. 233). Historically this upheaval was reflected in 
western thought in the form of nihilism, the final formative stage in the 
progress toward National Socialism:
Nie wäre es zu diesem [heutigen] Nullpunkt gekommen, wäre nicht seit etwa 
1880 [...] jene dem bisherigen Geist des Abendlandes entgegengesetzte Welle 
in die Höhe gekommen, jene Absage an die frühere Tiefe des Abendlandes, 
dessen angeblich den Nihilismus überwindender, in Wahrheit vornehmster 
nihilistischer Höhepunkt der späte Popular-Nietzsche wurde, - jenes in 
Wahrheit Antigeistige, das sich neben der vornehmen Libertinage des 
Geistigen und jener brutalen Libertinage der Macht in den immer höhere 
Wellen schlagenden Naturalismen, in jenen Imperialismen und Nationalismen 
austobte, (ibid, p. 221)
[We would never have arrived at our nadir if we had not been gradually overtaken 
since 1880 by nihilism. Nihilism is a mode of thought profoundly inimical to the 
western values that had held sway until then. It involved a rejection of our most 
profoundly held principles. The movement brought forth the popularised figure of the 
late Nietzsche allegedly overcoming nihilism but in fact representing its most 
distinguished nihilistic apostle. Nihilism united those anti-intellectual forces which,
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taking their place alongside an intellectual abandonment of values and the exercise of 
violence in the name of uncontrolled freedom, ran their violent course in various ever 
more alarming naturalistic artistic representations, or inspired imperialist and 
nationalistic enterprises.]
Nihilism came to be the dominant force ‘in people’s conduct of their 
everyday affairs’ (ibid, p. 12).25 Although it was undoubtedly founded by 
the German Nietzsche, it came to be regarded as a European, western 
phenomenon. It was ‘the underlying cause of the historical cataclysm which 
we Westerners and the Europeans in particular brought upon the rest of the 
world’ (ibid).26
One conclusion which emerges from this way of thinking, had it that it 
was not, to quote Karl Jaspers, the Germans ‘who were responsible for 
committing the most dreadful atrocities, but Europeans’ (Jaspers, 1986, p. 
264).27
Theological historians such as Künneth, declared these developments 
to be occidental and European rather than German. Thus in his 
‘Theological History of the Encounter Between National Socialism and 
Christianity’ published in 1947 under the title ‘The Fall’ (Der grosse 
Abfall), Künneth similarly set about reconstructing historical movement 
whose inner logic had led inevitably to National Socialism. He wrote: ‘The 
disaster and the fall of the Titans suddenly illuminated not only the 
situation of the West as a whole, but of mankind itself (Künneth, 1947, p. 
91).28 He argued that the ‘National Socialist catastrophe’ was a symptom of 
the deterioration of modem western society:
Unter diesem notwendigen geschichtstheologischen Aspekt wird der enge 
Rahmen des deutschen Schicksals im mitteleuropäischen Raum gesprengt 
und damit klar, daß der katastrophale Sturz nicht bloß eine Angelegenheit des 
deutschen Menschen, sondern ein Weltereignis darstellt, daß hier an einem 
Teil der Menschheit prinzipiell die Sache aller Völker zur Debatte steht, (ibid, 
P- 15)
[From the point of view of theology the limited question of the fate of Germany in 
Central Europe must be abandoned in view of the fact that the catastrophe concerns 
not merely the Germans, but the whole world, and that although it may appear that 
only part of mankind is directly affected, the fate of all peoples is in fact at issue.]
From the theological point of view, the onset of the modem period 
signified a movement away from Christianity common to the whole of the 
West. Künneth’s description of the pathology of the world ran as follows:
Der abendländische Mensch hatte seit langem die Mitte seines Lebens 
verloren und seine Seele war darüber krank geworden. Diese geheime 
moderne Weltkrankheit hatte das geistige Dasein aller Völker mehr oder 
weniger stark vergiftet, sie ballte sich aber im Herzen Europas zusammen und 
kam im nationalsozialistischen Denken und Wollen zum gewaltsamen 
Ausbruch, (ibid, p. 66)
[Western man, having lost the core of his being a long time ago, his soul had become 
sick. As a result of this hidden but ubiquitous modem affliction, the spiritual well-
being of all the peoples had become poisoned. This poison was at its most potent in 
the heart of Europe and finally found violent expression in National Socialist thought 
and actions.]
Like Alfred Weber, Kiinneth set out to reconstruct historical 
tendencies beyond national - perhaps we should read this as German - 
boundaries, in an attempt as it were, to internationalise the National 
Socialist phenomenon: ‘There is no doubt that this sickness of the western 
soul could have broken-out elsewhere, possibly differently. The symptoms 
of the abnormal conditions were in evidence everywhere’ (ibid).29 By 
internationalising the National Socialist phenomenon in this way, Kiinneth 
was able to reject the charge of an ethnically based collective German guilt: 
‘Grounding the attempt to establish the guilt of the German people for this 
disaster on the basis that Germans had been worse or more godless than 
other peoples, betrays a simplistic understanding of history’ (ibid).30 At the 
same time as he acknowledged a German guilt, he denied that it was 
amenable to explanation of itself:
Daß die latente Krankheit sich gerade hier in so furchtbarer Eruption 
offenbarte, ist geschichtstheologisch beurteilt, nicht in einem ‘mehr’ an 
Schuld begründet, sondern trägt die Qualität einer jenseits unserer Kategorien 
liegenden Schicksalsetzung, vor der die Warumfrage verstummen muß. (ibid) 
[From the theological historical point of view, the fact that a latent illness could erupt 
so dreadfully at this place at this point in history cannot be explained by positing a 
greater degree of guilt. It was a blow of fate, the reasons for which lie beyond human 
understanding, closed to the question of why.]
This response amounts to an extraordinary refusal to identify causal 
relationships between National Socialism and particular - possibly German 
- conditions. The response offered the theologian a scheme of denial. 
Equating the empirical question with the question of ultimate causes, 
removed it from possible explanation.
The construction of historical tendencies in the way we have described 
above, consisting typically of nihilism combined with the rejection of God,
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invoked the notion of a European destiny leading necessarily to National 
Socialism, the inevitable endpoint of European history. Under this 
interpretation, National Socialism is not a German phenomenon, its causes 
lie rather in the course of western history. This interpretative scheme runs 
through texts of the early post-war years. The fundamental idea is one of 
European destiny. This appears in a host of variations, such as ‘Geflecht 
des europäischen Schicksals’ [‘the destinies of all the European peoples are 
interwoven’] (Dirks, 1990, p. 195), ‘abendländische Tragödie; 
abendländische Krise’ [‘western tragedy; the crisis of the West’] (ibid, p. 
198), ‘dieser unserer geistigen Krise Europas’ [‘this material and spiritual 
crisis of our Europe’] (ibid, p. 194); ‘europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft’ 
[‘common European destiny’] (Kaiser speech, 16/06/1946); ‘Aus dem 
Europa der letzten Jahrhunderte ist das Verhängnis der gegenwärtigen 
Weltlage erwachsen’ [‘the present plight of the world stems from centuries 
of European development’.] (Jaspers, 1986, p. 262); ‘das katastrophale 
Schicksal, das über die Mitte Europas hereingebrochen ist’ [‘the 
catastrophic fate which befell Central Europe’] (Künneth, 1947, p. 9).
Such stereotyped formulations are not solely German. In his famous 
‘speech of hope’ of 6 September 1946, the American Foreign Minister 
Byrnes used expressions which were translated as ‘Germany and Europe’s 
recovery from illness’ (Hohlfeld, p. 132).31 But in written originals in 
German these phrases seemed to assume a legitimising function. Europe 
was used as an argument to relativise Germany’s guilt. Germany’s desire 
for integration was anticipated linguistically as the precondition for the 
emergence of National Socialism. A shift of values and the rejection of God 
and the intellectual decline of Germany were projected onto the whole of 
the European continent, a wider community of values and culture. The 
destiny of Germany was identified with that of Europe, the German crisis 
was identified as a European crisis and in this way via exculpation, 
Germany established its right to a place in the family of nations. In this way 
of thinking, the idea of a collective German guilt - subscribed to above all 
by the Americans - was rejected as unacceptable as the idea that guilt might 
relate to one country; a possibility articulated as follows by the American 
Foreign Minister Byrnes in his Stuttgart speech: ‘der deutsche Militarismus 
und der Nazismus [haben] die Gebiete von Deutschlands Nachbarn 
verwüstet’ [‘German militarism and Nazism have laid waste the lands of 
Germany’s neighbours’] (Hohlfeld, p. 132).
Europe, or the West, played a key role in early arguments that took the 
past as a frame of reference. In the context of attempts to internationalise
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the National Socialist phenomenon, Europe functioned as a key argument 
in establishing the German claim to reintegration by facilitating the 
obfuscation, indeed the denial, of the German origins of Fascism and its 
particular extreme German form. German guilt was relativised and glossed 
over by means of its Europeanisation. This strategy, incidentally, was not 
limited to the immediate post-war years. In 1954, six years after Kiinneth 
and Weber, a piece appeared by Joachim Moras entitled ‘The Middle of 
Europe’. In it Moras reflected on ‘typically German matters’ 
recommending the use of a ‘European lens’ for any such consideration:
[,..]damit ein plastisches, ein stereoskopisches Bild des Ganzen entstünde - 
demgegenüber sich dann plötzlich die Frage aufdrängen würde: was ist an 
alledem ausschließlich deutsches, was allgemeines Symptom dieser Zeit? 
(Moras, 1954, p. 445)
[[...] so that a three-dimensional stereoscopic view of the whole be achieved. In this 
setting an inevitable question would suddenly present itself: what is exclusively 
German about all of this? What should be regarded as generally symptomatic of the 
period?’]
Almost ten years after the end of the National Socialist era in other 
words, a way of thinking persisted which involved the Europeanisation of 
German history.
The argumentational structures we have described so far were, of 
course, not the only ones which were current. Those critical of events 
rejected the internationalisation of recent German or Austrian history, 
preferring a national version which might be instrumentalised for party 
political purposes. Interpretative schemes were advanced which supported 
particular socio-political programmes. The position taken by the KPD 
(Communist Party of Germany), and Kurt Schumacher may be cited as 
relevant examples. In such cases, notions of Europe were as irrelevant as 
ideas of decline.
In the modem version of history, arguments like those of Weber and 
Künneth according to which western civilisations were in their late dying 
stages, took the place of the typical nineteenth and twentieth century 
accounts which had seen in the West the highest level of human 
development. Oswald Spenglers’ ‘Decline of the West’ with its notion of a 
‘Faustian culture’ exemplified this theory of decline.
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Arguments which Lay Problems to Rest
Never before had a nation had the kind of opportunity to determine its 
future course of development such as that given to German society after 
1945. We have observed so far that a historical version of Europe which 
allowed recent German history to be relativised served to internationalise 
the intellectual movements which led to National Socialism. In European 
constructs fashioned to account for future developments, we can discern 
two techniques of legitimisation, the one intellectual, the other 
programmatic.
The first of these involved elaborating abstract possibilities by 
mobilising arguments based on historical legacy, cultural community, and 
shared values. Depending on the philosophy of those concerned, these 
arguments were couched in theological, philosophical or - if they served 
political ends - conservative terms.
Having described the structure of the SS-State in four hundred pages, 
Eugen Kogon called on the Germans to fulfil their true destiny:
[...] ist es nicht besser, die größte Niederlage seiner [des deutschen Volkes] 
Geschichte zum Anlaß zu nehmen, um in die eigenen verschütteten Tiefen 
hinabzusteigen, wo das Gold der hohen deutschen Qualitäten - jawohl: das 
Gold! begraben liegt, den geschichtlichen und gesamtseelischen Wurzeln der 
Schuld nachzuspüren und nach Generationen der Geduld gewandelt zur 
Erfüllung der wahren deutschen Aufgabe in Europa und der Welt, zur 
Leistung des Beitrags, der seinem gereinigten Wesen entspricht, 
hervorzutreten? (Kogon, 1946, p. 408)
[[...] is it not better to use the greatest defeat ever of our people as a reason to descend 
again into depths which have too long concealed the gold of true German qualities: 
there we may uncover the historical and spiritual roots of our guilt and then, in due 
time, re-emerge cleansed and purified to fulfil the true task allotted to the Germans in 
Europe and the world and make our fitting contribution?]
The theologian, Walter Künneth, was to continue to apply the logic of 
this interpretation by demanding - once he had construed National 
Socialism as a western fall from grace - a European return to belief in God: 
‘die Wendung zur Heimkehr zu Gott, das heißt aber die Rückkehr zur 
Offenbarungswirklichkeit Gottes in Jesus Christus’ [‘the return to God is 
no less than a return to the God revealed in the real Jesus Christ’.] 
(Künneth, 1947, p. 308). He received support in this from Romano 
Guardini: ‘Europa wird christlich, oder es wird überhaupt nicht mehr sein’
[‘Europe will either become Christian, or it will simply cease to exist’] 
(ibid).
The European tradition ended for Karl Jaspers in the final - entirely 
depoliticised - consequence of the human condition:
Auch Europa ist nicht das letzte für uns. Wir werden Europäer unter der 
Bedingung, daß wir eigentlich Menschen werden - das heißt Menschen aus 
der Tiefe des Ursprungs und des Zieles, welche beide in Gott hegen. (Jaspers, 
1986, p. 274).
[Nor is Europe the end for us. In becoming Europeans we become true human beings 
whose true origins and ultimate goal are in God.]
In the same way, Alfred Weber construed freedom and democracy as 
historically grounded goals for a future Europe:
Europa und insbesondere seine deutsche Mitte hat sich .. auf einer die 
Menschenwürde und Menschlichkeit vertretenden freien demokratischen 
Basis zu organisieren, sobald man ihm die freie Bewegung dazu läßt. (Weber, 
1946, p. 251).
[Europe especially its German centre, must be built on free democratic foundations 
which represent true humani.y and human dignity as soon as it is given the leeway for 
this to happen.]
Such utterances suggest that the contention of Jung and Wengeler that 
historical philosophical ideas ceased to exert influence after 1945, is 
mistaken. Indeed the arguments embedding German in European history 
continued to play a key role in the debate about the future of Germany. 
Such arguments were adduced not only by theologian and philosophers, but 
also by party politicians of a conservative persuasion.
The philosophical and intellectual tradition was assimilated into the 
conservative party political programme which used Europe and the 
Christian West as synonyms of one another. Five weeks after the end of the 
war, the authors of the draft CDU programme invoked Germany’s erstwhile 
greatness which it further described as ‘the Christian western values which 
once held sway among the German people who therefore were held in high 
regard by the other European nations’. (Programmentwurf der CDU, 
17/06/1945).32
Konrad Adenauer was convinced that Europe could only become a 
reality:
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[...] wenn eine Gemeinschaft der europäischen Völker wiederhergestellt 
wird, in der jedes Volk seinen unersetzlichen, unvertretbaren Beitrag zur 
europäischen Wirtschaft und Kultur, zum abendländischen Denken, Dichten 
und Gestalten liefert. (Adenauer speech, 24/03/1946)
[[...]if a community of all the other peoples of Europe were recreated, which would 
allow each nation to make its essential and unique contribution to European culture 
and commerce and to bring its influence to bear on western literature, thought and the 
plastic arts.]
And even Jacob Kaiser, the Christian Democrat’s declaration to the 
delegates attending the 1946 CDU Party Conference that ‘true democrats 
are the best Europeans’ (Kaiser speech, 16/06/1946)33 made the connection 
with the western tradition through his inclusion of the highly positive but 
usefully vague term ‘democracy’. The aim of conservative policies in the 
post-war period was absolute separation from the communist eastern bloc, 
an aim served by the construct of a western, Christian Europe.
The liberal version of Europe also subscribed to the same 
philosophical tradition which we have described. The idea was developed 
of a relationship between the liberal and the wider western history, indeed 
they were seen as one and the same tradition. Liberals sought to remove the 
implications of National Socialist propaganda by redefining liberalism:
[...] in dem ganz breiten und allgemeinen Sinne einer Idee, die im Grunde 
das Wesen abendländischer Kultur schlechthin ausmacht.[...] In [diesem] 
Sinne sind wir alle Liberale, soweit wir die uns unersetzlich scheinenden 
Werte und Einrichtungen gegen jene zerstörenden Kräfte verteidigen, die wir 
als Kollektivismus, Totalitarismus oder Nationalsozialismus bezeichnen 
können. [...] Der Liberalismus ist [...] ein machtvoller Stamm, der ein 
ehrwürdiges Alter aufweist und unter dessen Laubdach wir uns alle heute in 
dem sicheren Gefühl zusammenfmden, daß wir etwas Gemeinsames zu 
verteidigen haben, mögen wir uns sonst auch Konservative oder Sozialisten, 
Demokraten oder Liberale, Protestanten oder Katholiken nennen. (Röpke, 
1947, p. 11)
[Liberalism forms] in its most general sense the very bedrock of western civilisation in 
so far as we defend what we consider to be crucial values and institutions against the 
destructive forces known as collectivism, totalitarianism or National Socialism. We 
are all liberals, liberalism is an ancient and mighty tree in whose shade we come 
together united by our common feeling that we have something to defend together, 
whatever we may call ourselves - conservative or socialist, democrat or pacifist, 
Protestant or catholic.]
The liberal world view - reviled by the Nazis as liberalist - was 
therefore reinterpreted and inherent from the beginning in European
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culture. In this way, the non-partisan Wilhelm Röpke who was later to 
become an adviser to the Adenauer government, prepared the foundation on 
which liberal ideas could be established across party political lines.
Socialists and social democrats politicised their version of Europe so 
that it could serve as a legitimating function in their own programmatic 
designs. Whilst they too had recourse to the western history argument, they 
used it to argue the necessity for particular, quite concrete political 
measures. In 1945 a phrase appeared which linked ‘western democrats and 
socialists’ (Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 21)34 and which 
clearly indicated the sense of their political programmes. Variants of this 
formulation appeared constantly in the socialist version of society.
In the first issue of the Frankfurter Hefte sharp distinctions were 
drawn not only between socialist Europe on the one hand and Russian 
bolshevism and a gargantuan American fascism on the other, but between 
the former and Germany itself, with talk of ‘the creation of a new Europe, 
united in socialism [...] not Russian bolshevism or American fascism, but 
Europe, not Germany but Europe’ (Frankfurter Hefte 1/1946).35
Walter Dirks one of the editors of the Frankfurter Hefte produced a 
piece entitled ‘Socialism and the West’ in which he - having interpreted 
National Socialism as the result of a departure from the western tradition - 
urged the necessity of re-engaging with the European western legacy, albeit 
now with a certain critical caution. He described the results of this 
rediscovery as follows: ‘The West will be socialist or it will cease to be. If 
Europe divides into ‘West’ and ‘socialism’, it will collapse’ (Dirks, 1990, 
p. 201).36 Dirks saw ‘socialism as the enterprise which could bring about 
the painful recovery of the West, the attempt to breathe new life into the 
legacy of Europe and thus make it viable once more’ (ibid, p. 200).37
This version of events was rooted in the concept of a European destiny 
- a key formula in the discourse we have described as using the past - which 
reveals clearly the inner logic of the argumentation. Projections for the 
future involved Europe, not Germany. At the same time the European 
argument served to render the socialistic view of the desirable society 
acceptable. There is a clear attempt to give socialism a human face, to make 
it seem familiar by adding some western traits as it were:
Abendland und Sozialismus müssen einander durchdringen. In einer 
sozialistischen Ordnung muß sich die abendländische Grundsubstanz die 
aktuelle, realistische, faktische, moderne Gestalt geben und zugleich das gute 
Gewissen im Sinn der sozialen Gerechtigkeit wiedergewinnen, das nicht in 
der Sehnsucht nach dem intakten Abendland (dem mittelalterlichen ‘Ordo’
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vor dem bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Sündenfall) zu suchen und zu finden ist, 
sondern nur durch den opfervollen Umbau der modernen Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft wiedererrungen werden kann. Anderseits muß der Sozialismus in 
der positiven kritischen Aneignung unseres abendländischen Erbes geistige 
und menschliche Fülle, Maß und Demut suchen und finden, (ibid, p. 201) 
[Socialism and the West must inter-penetrate one another. In a socialist order the basic 
socialist values must take on a modem realistic form. At the same time socialism must 
rediscover its true sense of social justice, which lies not in some innocent intact 
version of the West but will be recreated only through selfless devotion to the 
reconstruction of the economic and social structure here and now. At the same time 
however, socialism must espouse moderation and humility, must seek to create 
conditions which will allow all citizens to achieve human and intellectual fulfilment.]
Finally we may turn to Kurt Schumacher who said the following on 
the subject of the contemporary European debate: ‘The debate on Europe is 
in reality the search for life’s deeper meaning after a period of senseless 
stasis’ (Schumacher speech, 29/06/1947).38 For Schumacher this ‘deeper 
meaning’ was in fact a ‘united Germany in a socialist Europe’ (Schumacher 
speech, ‘Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie’):
Wir wissen, worum es in Deutschland geht: das ist der gerechte soziale 
Ausgleich, der sozialistische Neubau der Wirtschaft, der Aufbau der 
Demokratie und die Erhaltung des deutschen Reiches in einem 
internationalen europäischen Rahmen. (Schumacher speech, 27/01/1946)
[We know what is at issue in Germany, social justice through a fairer distribution of 
resources, the socialist reconstruction of the economy, the creation of true democracy 
and the preservation of the German Empire in an international European framework.]
Schumacher seeks legitimisation of a socialist Europe in the 
connection between socialism and the West in the form of a surprising 
causal relationship: ‘The West is not dead because socialism and 
democracy are alive’ (Schumacher speech, 29/06/1947).39
This is reminiscent in the way that the European idea was updated 
through the attribution of Christian and western which amounted to a kind 
of linguistic appropriation, something vehemently rejected by Kurt 
Schumacher on the grounds that it constituted an exclusive claim to the 
Christian past of Europe on the part of the Christian Democratic Union. But 
Schumacher’s projection of the coming shape of Europe actually equated 
the western tradition with a socialist societal order. Schumacher’s 
invocation of the ‘western idea’ turned out to be based every bit as much on 
the preservation of conservative values as the philosophy of his opponent 
Adenauer.
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Conclusion
Our findings may be summarised thus: the connotations we associate with 
the key terms Europe and the West, spell security and order. They are the 
linguistic expressions of inestimable qualities in an era when people are 
typically confused, desperate, haunted by apocalyptic fears. The frequency 
of such references in the early post-war years documents the mental 
condition of a whole generation. Political circumstances forced the 
Germans to establish that their desires for re-integration are legitimate. 
Herein lies the attempt to recover ‘a lost unity and security in the idea of 
the western tradition’ (Dirks, 1990, p. 193). This idea is instrumentalised as 
a political argument after 1945. Such instrumentalisation is part of the 
history of German political discourse and the German mentality in the early 
post-war years. Distinguishing between past and future orientations has 
enabled us to identify two opposite, indeed contradictory attitudes.
The former are explications, that is they seek to explain the way that 
recent historical developments led to National Socialism. The arguments 
which follow logically from this explanatory scheme are supported by the 
notion of the decline of the West, which necessarily culminated in National 
Socialism. The version of the West is stigmatised as one of death and 
decay. Concepts in the language of the future orientated schemes of 
explanation express wishes rather than actuality, serving to give linguistic 
expression to, and therefore at the same time, be constitutive of, a desired 
future form of society. This desired state of affairs is based on an argument 
containing a highly positive version of Europe. The argumentational 
strategy is based on the arguments of the cultural unity and the community 
of values which underpin the western tradition.
Various versions of Europe in the early post-war years are revealed as 
the linguistic documents of an albeit instrumentalised and selective 
historical consciousness which attempts to correct people’s real experience 
of what they are actually experiencing. This puts a question mark against 
the idea of a loss of German identity post-1945. The German identity seems 
indeed not to be lost, the Germans seem to be in no doubt about who they
are.
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Notes
1 All translations for this chapter have been produced by the editors of this volume. 
References given in the text refer to original German sources. Unless indicated 
otherwise all original German quotations are provided in subsequent endnotes.
2 ‘Das Römische Reich ist ein Land, so vor sich selbst bestehet und in deßen Macht ist, 
glückselig zu seyn, wenn es will [...]. Das Reich ist das Haupt-Glied, Teutschland das 
mittel von Europa’.
3 Erhalte es wieder ‘eine civil person und Form’, werde ‘ganz Europa [...] sich zur 
Ruhe begeben, in sich selbst zu wüten aufhören’.
4 So werde ‘Teutschland in sein flor, Europa in die balance [...] wieder kommen’.
5 ‘[...] durch Deutschlands Ruhe und Sicherheit wird immer die von einem großen Teil 
Europens zugleich mitgesichert’.
6 ‘Anfangsgründe von der Wissenschaft von der heutigen Staatsverfassung von Europa’.
7 ‘natürliche Föderativverfassung von Europa’.
8 ‘Föderalvereinigung der europäischen Völkerschaften, Europäische Föderation, 
Europäischer Bundesstaat, Europäische Konföderation, Europäischer Bund, 
Europäische Union’.
9 Anzeichen, ‘in denen sich ausspricht, daß Europa eins werden will’.
10 ‘The federation of European states’, Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 5.
11 ‘The desirable European Federation’, (ibid, p. 15); ‘our moral contribution to 
thisfederation should be the fact that there is no longer a German state’ (Brödner, 
1948, p. 429; ‘a really viable European federation’ (Adenauer, 21/09/1949).
12 European unity (Frankfurter Hefte 1 /1946).
13 ‘In the process of European unification’ (Brödner, 1948, p. 429).
14 ‘The will to create the United States of Europe ... the willingness to cooperate closely 
in a European community, bom out of a healthy, cleansed self-confidence’ (Kaiser, 
16/06/1946); ‘A new Germany would regard being part of the United States of Europe 
as its highest responsibility” (Schumacher, Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie); ‘the United States of Europe’ (Adenauer, 21/09/1949).
15 ‘The community of European nations’ (Adenauer, 24/03/1946); ‘the will to create a 
European community’ (ibid).
16 ‘wirtschaftliche Einheit Europas’.
17 ‘geistige und sittliche Werte und Güter der europäischen Kultur’.
18 ‘die christlichen und abendländischen Lebenswerte’.
19 ‘europäische[s] Bewußtsein [...] abendländische Kultur [...] Rettung der abend-
ländischen Kultur’.
20 ‘Geist des Abendlandes’.
21 ‘um der geistigen Werte, um der Kultur des Abendlandes willen’.
22 ‘abendländische[s] Seelentum’.
23 ‘die abendländische Kultur der Christenheit’.
24 ‘alle abendländischen Werte und menschlichen Grundordnungen[...], welche Hellas, 
Rom, Judäa überliefert haben und die das Germanentum mitgeschaffen haben’.
25 ‘für die Alltags- und die allgemeine Aufgabenorientierung weitgehend herrschende^.] 
Nihilismus’.
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26 ‘die tiefere Ursache [...] für den katastrophalen geschichtlichen Zusammenbruch [...], 
den wir Abendländer, insbesondere wir Europäer, über die Welt gebracht haben’.
27 ‘Europäer haben sich der größten Schandtaten schuldig gemacht’.
28 ‘Die nationalsozialistische Katastrophe und der Titanensturz haben blitzartig die 
gesamte abendländische Situation, ja zuletzt die Lage der Menschheit beleuchtet’.
29 ‘Fraglos hätte dieses Durchbrechen der Krankheit des abendländischen Seelentums 
auch an anderer Stelle und in anderer Weise erfolgen können, denn die Symptome 
dieses anormalen Zustandes sind überall in Erscheinung getreten’.
30 ‘Es zeugt daher von großer Oberflächlichkeit und mangelndem geistesgeschichtlichen 
Verständnis, wenn man die Schuld des deutschen Volkes an dieser Katastrophe mit 
dem Urteil begründen zu können meint, das deutsche Volk sei schlechter, sei gottloser 
als andere Völker gewesen’.
31 ‘Gesundung Deutschlands und Europas’.
32 ‘die christlichen und abendländischen Lebenswerte, die einst das deutsche Volk 
beherrschten und es groß und angesehen machten unter den Völkern Europas’.
33 ‘die echten Demokraten[.. .Jsind [.. .]die besten Europäer’.
34 ‘abendländische Demokraten und Sozialisten’.
35 ‘ein neu zu bildendes Europa in einer sozialistischen Ordnung zusammengefaßt [...] 
nicht russischen Bolschewismus oder amerikanischen Mammutfaschismus, sondern 
Europa, nicht Deutschland, sondern Europa’.
36 ‘Das Abendland wird sozialistisch sein, oder es wird nicht sein. Zerfällt Europa in das 
“Abendland” und in den “Sozialismus”, so zerfällt es in sich selbst’.
37 ‘Sozialismus [...][ist] die Aufgabe [...] an der das Abendland unter Schmerzen 
gesunden kann [...] das europäische Erbe in gewandelter Form neu lebensfähig zu 
machen’.
38 ‘Die Diskussion über Europa ist doch in Wahrheit das Suchen nach einer Sinngebung 
des Lebens, nachdem wir jetzt eine Periode sinnlosen Vegetierens durchgemacht 
haben’.
39 ‘Das Abendland ist nicht tot. Denn Sozialismus und Demokratie leben’.
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